Session 25 of 40 - Entering the Middle Way

Entering the Middle Way, 20 June 1991, part 1

20 June 1991 - 44 min KR-0016.26

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Transcript: Corrected Transcript generated by speech recognition and AI correction; may contain errors.

I’m going to listen to and reflect upon and cultivate in meditation the essence of the great vehicle, that is of meaning of emptiness. So for the next three minutes cultivate such a motivation. So, in the last teaching we were discussing the second of these five principle reasonings and this was the reasoning refuting the production by means of the four extremes and that is the four extremes of production where production from self, production from other, production of both and causeless production. Production from self was asserted by the school of Sāṃkhya and in order to refute this assertion then it was necessary to refute that there is no production from self. So we should try it’s necessary to understand well the assertions of the Sāṃkhya without understanding what they are asserting, then though we might make use of the reasoning, without recognizing what in fact they are asserting, our reasoning will have no power.

It doesn’t have any force to it. So in order our reasoning which acts to refute has power, we must recognize exactly what assertions we must understand what assertions we’re refuting. These are the enumerators and they enumerate 25 objects of knowledge they assert a cyclic existence and liberation from a cyclic existence and it is by coming to realize this enumeration of 25 objects of knowledge that one is able to reverse from cyclic existence. So they enumerate 25 objects of knowledge. The first of these is the principle.

Principle. This is a cause which has no product. It’s called the principle. Then the second category of these objects of knowledge is seven they enumerate seven objects of knowledge which have both cause and effect. Then there are 16 which have no cause but are an effect.

And then there is a single object of knowledge which is neither a cause nor effect, enumerating 25. The first one is called the principle and it is the cause which does not have an effect. The second category is an enumeration of seven which are objects of knowledge which are both causes and effects. Then there’s a third category of objects of knowledge consisting of sixteen which are effects but have no cause. And then the fourth category is a single object of knowledge which is neither a cause nor an effect.

So the first is the principal cause and it is a cause but it itself is not an effect. It is called the principal So what is the main argument which is which arises with respect to the enumerators? They posit a principle and their assertion is that the seed and the sprout are of the same nature because the seed and the sprout and the principal are all of the same nature because the seed and sprout and the principal are of the same nature, the seed and the sprout are the same nature. If Because the seed, the sprout and the principal are of the same nature, the seed and the sprout are of the same nature, if the seed and the sprout are of the same nature then they must be inseparably one just as flower — the Tibetan word for flower is metok — just as flower and metok are inseparably one, the seed and the sprout would be inseparably one. If the seed and the sprout were of the same nature then it would be just as in the case of the flower and metok.

At the time of metok the flower exists, at the time of the flower the metok exists and likewise if the seed and the sprout were the same nature, then at the time of the seed, the sprout must necessarily exist. At the time of the sprout, the seed must necessarily exist. So if you accept this position then since the sprout exists at the time of the seed then it is meaningless for the sprout to grow from the seed since it already exists and therefore production, the growing of the sprout from the seed is meaningless, is purposeless since it already exists at the time of the seed. Introducing the actual verse from the root text which sets out this argument, it says that there is no use, for the production of a sprout from a seed since it already exists at the time of the seed. The effect arises in dependence upon a cause.

For example, the sprout depends upon the seed. In dependence upon the seed the sprout arises but if in this case according to the present assertion then the effect exists already at the time of the cause. Therefore it becomes purposeless for production of what already exists. For example, take two fingers — these do not arise dependent upon one another. Why?

Because they exist simultaneously. Since they exist simultaneously, then one does not arise in dependence upon the other because they exist simultaneously. So it is the nature of cause and effect that is sequential, that one is previous and one is subsequent, but if as in this case, therefore because there is a dependence, because the effect arises out of the cause, there is a purpose for production because that which exists at the time of the cause, because the result has not been as yet produced, it is non existent at the time of the cause, therefore it is purposeful for the arising of the result from the cause since it is not yet existent. But in this case because in the case of the two fingers, because they exist simultaneously then they do not have they are not serially related, therefore they do not have a relationship of cause and effect, one arising dependent upon the other. But the enumerators, they say that it’s necessary for sprouts to grow out of seeds but the sprout exists at the time of the seed, but even though the sprout exists at the time of the seed, it’s still necessary for it to grow, to develop.

So entering the in the middle way sets forth the reasoning that there is no purpose for the production of a sprout again because it already exists at the time of the seed. That since the sprout is already existing, at the time of the seed it has already developed. That has been established has already developed and therefore there’s no purpose for it to develop again, there’s no purpose for it to grow again. So the argument is being presented that because the sprout exists at the time of the seed then though you assert that it’s necessary for it to develop, though you assert that it’s necessary for the sprout to develop, in fact is no need for it to develop again since it’s already developed, it existing at the time of the seed. Therefore you must accept that though the sprout has already developed at the time of the seed that it is necessary that it be developed again.

That is your assertion. And therefore the sprout must be developed twice. So you assert that the sprout is already developed at the time of the seed and still it is necessary for the sprout to develop again. Then if that’s the case then even when the sprout is developed the second time, the seed has not become non existent, it has not been destroyed, it has not ceased to exist. Even at the time of the second production of the sprout, the seed still exists.

So even though the sprout has developed the seed still remains. So if this were the case, this in fact cannot be the case because when the sprout, even at the time when the stem and the grain has developed, there continues to remain a seed and this has never appeared to anyone in the world. For example farmers who plant seeds that at the time of the stem and the grain developed from the sprout that there still remains the seed. But this has never been appeared to anyone in the world that you say that upon the development of the sprout it is necessary that upon the development of the sprout that the seed remain existing since they are of the same nature, that the seed must continue to exist even at the time of the sprout, even at the time when there are stems of the sprout and grain has the fruit of the sprout has arisen. But no one in the world has seen this, the seed does not disintegrate at the time of the sprout.

The seed must remain continuously even at the time of the sprout. While the seed exists there cannot arise the results of that seed, the stem, the sprout, the stem and the grains. If this were the case, if you say that this is the case as long as the seed continues to exist there can be no sprout and if the seed is continually existent then there would never arise sprouts, there would never arise stems and grains but the sprouts, stems and grains would not appear to anyone in the world, but this is not in fact the case, that they do appear to, stems and grains do appear to people of the world and therefore that there must occur a disintegration of the seed in order for the production of the stems and grains to arise to appear. When the sprout is established the seed ceases its existence that the seed becomes nonexistent at the time of the production of the sprout. And this is why in the world we are able to see crops.

You say that the sprout and the seed are of the same nature, they are one just as in the case of flower and matok. Therefore as in the case of flower and metok when one ceases, when the flower ceases the matok ceases because they are one, they are of the same nature. When one ceases the other must necessarily cease to exist. So if the seed ceases to exist then the sprout must also cease to exist and then they cannot arise any crops. But not only that, but if the seed and the sprout are of the same nature just as the flower and the metok are of the same nature, that is to say they are inseparably one, then the various attributes of the seed such as its shape, its color, and its potency would be undifferentiable from the various attributes of the sprout, the shape, the color, the potency of the sprout.

So it is by means of these various reasons that Candrakīrti is able to refute the assertions of this proponent, that they are not able to maintain their assertions in the face of these various reasonings, that the seed and the sprout are not of the same nature, that upon the production of the sprout the seed ceases to exist. Candrakīrti goes on stating that if the seed and the sprout are of the same nature then at the time of the sprout because the seed does not exist, likewise the sprout would become non existent. So Candrakīrti is addressing these enumerators and saying that you’re supposed to be proponents of reasoning, but your assertions are extremely poor. That even the unlearned farmers who plant seeds and grow crops, they know that the seed and the sprout are not the same entity, are not the same nature because they know that when the seed, in order for the sprout to be produced, the seed must cease to exist.

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