Bodhisattvacaryavatara, 29 March 1994, part 1

Here, we continue from teaching, and the context instruction was on the point where the line says, for the purpose of the result, one engages. In brief, here in the establishment of the topic of emptiness in Buddhist explanation, explanation, the perspective about emptiness retained by Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the Prāsaṇgika Buddhist school is the supreme view. And there, the emptiness is explained to be non inherent existence of the things of phenomena. Now, the other Buddhist tenets who are lower to could not comprehend the meaning meaning of non inherent existence. In their in their mental capacity, they could not they could not accept or understood understand own right.

So they profess a theory of emptiness, which still is the saying things exist by its own characteristics or by its own right. And as a consequences, they put forth certain counter questions to the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. And in return, the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika refutes their counter questions and so forth. In this way, question, counter question, and so forth is the nature of the text here so far in the ninth chapter. Our first, when the emptiness is explained as noninherent existence, there naturally are a great deal of arguments put forth by the others, meaning the lower Buddhist tenets.

So it is necessary in presenting presenting the instructions here by the author that firstly, those arguments need to be refuted to be proven wrong. Only then would instruction can explain or can sorry, can go direct into the actual explanation of the emptiness, the non inherent existence, what it is, and so forth. Amongst the arguments, let’s look at the argument put forth by the lowest Buddhist tenet, the specific exponents, the Vaibhāṣika. They say your explanation about emptiness that things do not inherently exist, which is, in another words, that things do not exist by their own right, is unacceptable because things do exist by their own rights. For example, the five objects of the five senses form, sight, smell, sound, taste that sensation, these actually do exist because it is something we can directly see, feel, so forth to be existing by their own right.

If these do not exist by their own right, then it would mean that there are there are not at all these five objects of the senses. In this way, the argument put forth is on that basis, not is not not true that things do not exist by their own right. Instead, the things exist by their own right. Then answer to that put forth by Śāntideva is the answer in accordance to the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the highest middle way school, that the answer says, the existence apparently being perceived of the five objects by the five senses are as conventionally valid that things exist in that way. But apart from conventional validity, apart from conventional standard, things in actual fact do not exist by their own right.

For the five objects or the five senses do not exist in the actual state by their own right. Because to the eye, which even if it is inherently even if it is existing by its own right, to it, the form or visual things do not exist by their own right. As well to the emptiness of the inherent the emptiness of inherent existence of the eye, to that as well form or visual objects do not exist by their own right. And in brief, it is only to the extent of worldly convention that things exist as if by their own right. Well, in accordance to that, then the response by the high school continues saying, well, if things do exist to the five senses, such as the I sense, ear sense, nose sense, tongue sense, and the physical sense, if they do exist as per the five senses, which is the valid direct perception of the five senses, then it would mean that even ordinary person perceives the reality of things as they are.

Because if the way things exist is existing by their own right or truly existing, then that is what ordinary person as will perceive. Therefore, it would mean that ordinary person or beings as well perceive reality, in which case the consequence result would be that there is no purpose in doing study, reflection, meditation on emptiness, on non inherent existence of thing. There is no purpose in doing all the trainings to realize reality because reality already is perceived by ordinary beings. So anyway, that’s the answer put forth. Buddha also in his own or in its own words says, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body are not valid in reference to object.

And that part of his teaching would mean in such cases where that in realizing emptiness the eye sense is not valid, it is not correct. In realizing emptiness the ear sense is not correct. That’s the meaning. But of course, that does not negate the conventional validity of the senses, that conventionally, senses would still perceive conventional object. But they are not valid in terms of realizing emptiness.

Well, the lowest tenet are specific exponent and its next higher tenet Sautrāntika group, they still put forth the counter response saying, oh, well, the eye senses as well as other senses are, say, no doubt, not valid in realizing emptiness. But still, they are valid. But they are still valid in realizing the in the case of I, in realizing form existing by its own right. Because in even in the world, it is conventionally known that form are existing that that a form exist by its own right. So that’s the counter response.

Now in response, the highest tenet says merely that something is valid by the standard of worldly convention is not good enough as a fact to prove its validity because in that case then, say, even in that case, let’s say the example in worldly convention, human body, male or female, is considered beautiful and clean. But that’s not the actual state. Although conventionally, in worldly convention, the body is seen as clean, likable. But then if we are to, in that case, do we have to accept that body is clean? It is.

And the answer is it is not. Therefore, in the same way, to say that because by worldly convention, the form, sound, smell, and so forth are existing by its own right or truly existing, that is not the ultimate standard by which to measure or validate something as as being proven in that way. So that’s the counter answer. In this way, through reasoning, the Prāsaṇgika Middle Way School refutes the counter responses and the arguments put forth by the lower tenets. And now in response, the lower Buddhist tenets put forth to the highest middle way school that even in the teachings of the Buddha itself, your assertion will be contradicted because you because Buddha has taught things are impermanent, and as well there is implication that Buddha explains every that Buddha explains inherent existence of things, that Buddha explains things exist by their own right.

And now here, contrary to that here, you are saying things do not exist by their own right, that things do not truly exist. So therefore, what the middle highest middle school, what you are saying is in contradiction to the actual words of the Buddha. So that’s what the lower schools then bring forth the argument. The response is that Buddha, by being very skillful in his approach to lead the disciples of various mental faculty, in this case, has taught things are existing by their own right, that things inherently exist. And it is the skillfulness it shows the skillfulness of the Buddha because presently, if that is taught to the right disciple through that way, gradually, the disciple could be led to the higher understanding that things do not inherently exist.

As interpretive note, inherently existing, existing by its own right, truly existing naturally from there, these all can be seen as synonymous, interchangeable. So it is the very skillfulness of the Buddha who presently teaches inherent existence in order for the disciple later on to come to the understanding that things do not truly exist, that things do not inherently exist. Buddha can be seen as the doctor who prescribes at different stage up to the same person, different prescriptions. For example, if the patient personally is with high fever, the doctor advises not to eat yogurt, not to eat meat, not to eat egg, and so forth, and then gives medicine. And then later on, when the fever is subsided, then the wind is abnormally rising.

Then the same physician, the doctor, advises, you should eat yogurt, you should eat meat. So you should eat meat, that’s where the latter part was. And you should eat maize corn. So in this way, there are two contradictory prescriptions given to the same patient. So in this way, in response to lower tenets, the highest tenets is in establishing the emptiness, emptiness, the non inherent existence of things, we can we can have the validation through reasonings and as well through quote quotation or citations from the Buddha’s own word.

As therefore in this way, through either mesh or through either way, there is no contradiction in saying that things do not exist by their own right, that things do not inherently exist. Now at this stage of the arguments and the counterpoints put forth by the lower tenets, the lower tenet continues at this stage by saying, you have earlier mentioned that things do not exist inherently. And as as as evidence, you said that things things are like illusions and like dreams. Now if that is the case, then then in essence, you meaning the high middle school, you are saying that things are like illusions and like dreams. Now if that is the case then this would mean there’s no benefit, there’s there’s no purpose in trying to achieve Buddhahood, in trying to achieve enlightenment.

And as well, therefore, there’s no purpose and benefit in putting effort to accumulate merits and do the host of practices required to attain Buddhahood, practices such as generosity and so forth. So in this way, this is the argument now put forth by the lower tenets. In response, the highest tenet says, well, it is true that as you are pointing my stand, that things or phenomena are not truly existing and they are like illusions, like dreams. But this does not negate the need to become enlightened as well the need to accumulate merit merits and engage in the practices required to achieve that. Because although things are not truly existing and they are like illusion, but within the basis, on the basis of illusion, there can be nominally the feasibility of accumulating merits, doing practice, and achieving Buddhahood.

Because as far as you are concerned, meaning the lower tenets, as far as you are concerned, if it is feasible that by doing offerings and practices and accumulating merits and by making offerings to a truly existing object, truly existing Buddha, that merits can be accumulated, that progress can be made, then how then here in this case, the same can be applied that although things and phenomena are not truly existing like illusion and Buddha too is like illusion, but by making offering and doing practices still on functioning level, the whole thing works. So it is a similar case as you are saying. Things exist by their own right. For the reason for that is if the Buddha teach that things do not exist by their own right, then the disciples of lower tenets would think that their their things do not exist exist at all. And because of that, they will have misconception, thinking there is no need to accumulate merit, and there is no need to do prostrations.

There is no need to make attempt to liberate from the cycle from the saṃsāra. Instead, if the Buddha the Buddha taught as it did that things exist by their own right, then the disciple then thinks that things are there. And on that basis, they get the they get the they get the idea and the working possibility of the whole practices such as prostration, generosity, patience and the other practices in order to liberate from saṃsāra and so forth. So in this way, one can say that it is only for them to be benefited that the Buddha taught in that way. And it is therefore in teaching to them that things do exist by their own right, that things do exist truly, that given in the context meaning, it really it really was of a great benefit to those of the lower tenets.

Teaching Between the things do not exist truly or teaching things exist truly, it is it was it was more beneficial to the lower tenets to be taught that things do exist truly, that things do exist by their own right. Now there is another argument put forth by the lower tenets. And that is, as you are saying, meaning the highest tenet. If you if as you are saying, things are like illusion as if in magic, then then sentient beings are like Then sentient beings are like illusions in the magic. Now in the case of illusions in magic, when the power of the spell diminishes, the manifestation through the magic also diminishes.

And when the power of the spell is gone, the the manifestation also is gone. For example, when the power of the spell is completely diminished, the manifestation of horses and oxes on the charmed thing also disappears. Disappears. Now similarly, if sentient beings are illusions or like illusion, then when they die, they will not be born again because it’s like their spell power to remain manifested has expired. Wouldn’t you accept that?

So that’s the question put forth. No. If illusion is to be compared to the context meaning, then because illusion, you know, also is subject to expiry, then sentient beings also is similarly subject to expiry during death. In response, the highest middle way tenet explains, well, the whole circling of a sentient being in the cycle in saṃsāra is due to impure thoughts and karma. It is due to these two that a sentient being is born and is circling in the saṃsāra, in cycle, circling the little word meaning wandering choicelessly.

Now the moment the impure thoughts and karma are not there, the sentient being will cease to be in saṃsāra, in this cyclic existence. The sentient beings the sentient being will cease to be in this state, although the continuity of that consciousness will remain in the form of liberated mind. Therefore, it is exactly similar to the case of illusion produced in magic case because in the same way, as long as there is the substance and the spell which chants the substance, when these two are complete, when these two are gathered, the manifestation of illusion will be there. The moment these two are not present, the substance and the spell, the formula spell, if these two are not there, the illusion will not be there. Therefore, still, it does not negate the validity of the manifestation being there in the example when these two are gathered.

And in the case of the context meaning, the validity that sentient beings still is there in saṃsāra, at least it cannot be negated in the similar way. So it is exactly similar case where in the case of sentient being, if the karma and impure thoughts are there, then the existence in the saṃsāra, in the cycle, will be there. The moment the karma and impure thoughts cease to exist or cease to be there, then the existence in the cycle is also ceased. Therefore, it is same. And in the case of example, again, if the substance, which which is charmed and the spell, the formula which charms the substance, if these two are there, then the illusory manifestation of illusory horses or ox or any spectacle that is produced by the magician will be there.

The moment the substance and the spell, the formula, are not there, the manifestation, the illusory manifestation also cease to be there. We can then conclude the two are same, that two can still be valid as long as those are gathered under. So was the language of the teaching clear? Is it very clear as we go along the question and the answer and the question and answer? No.

Oh, thank you. Is it very confusing or messy? No. Yeah. So this part was dealing with the rebirthing in the being born again in the saṃsāra, and it brings to light the validity by relating it with the validity of the manifestation in the illusion in in the illusion illusion produced produced by by the the magic.

Magic. So So it it is in that way bringing similarity in the two cases. Again, now there is another argument And, put forth by the lower tenets. Before we go into that, just let me say, interpret it. These actually are very interesting, as you can relate as representation of possible questions regarding the non inherent existence.

So it can be like you can put yourself in the lower Buddhist tenets perspective and see the light of the argument brought forth. Now continuing, now another argument is put forth by the lower tenets and they say, well, if sentient beings are like illusions, illusions, like like illustrating manifestation magic, then there is the implication that virtue and non virtue will be invalid. How that is so is in the case of illusion, when an illusion is produced in a magic, even if that illusion, the produced illusion is strike with weapons, beaten, or spoken rudely, there is nothing to be heard. And there’s no hurting. There’s no inflection at all.

Similarly, then you will have to accept that if sentient beings are like illusion, then if you strike weapons or beat them or speak rudely to them, there should not be any non virtue negativity being accumulated by the one inflicting the pain, because the argument is the same. So that is the argument put forth. So reason for laughter was because it seemed quite funny to put forth in that way.